

Contact Information

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Education

Columbia University, USA <i>Columbia Business School</i> <i>Department of Finance and Economics</i> Ph.D. Candidate, Finance and Economics Areas of Interest: Corporate Finance, Banking, Financial Intermediation	2013 – 2018 (<i>expected</i>)
Yale University, USA <i>MA with Honors, International and Development Economics</i>	2010 – 2011
Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece <i>Department of Economics</i>	2005 – 2009
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium <i>Department of Economics</i>	2007 – 2008

Research

Job Market Paper

Personal Relations in Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from Corporate Loans

Winner of 2017 Washington University in St.Louis WFA-CFAR Best Finance PhD Paper Award

This paper presents evidence that personal relationships between corporate borrowers and bank loan officers improve the outcomes of loan renegotiation. Exploiting a bank reorganization in Greece in the mid-2010s, I find that firms that experience an exogenous interruption in their loan officer relationship confront three consequences: one, the firms are less likely to renegotiate their loans; two, conditional on renegotiation, the firms are given tougher loan terms; and three, the firms are more likely to default on the renegotiated loans. These results point to the importance of personal relationships in mitigating the cost of distress for both borrowers and lenders in loan renegotiations.

Working Paper

Securing the Unsecured: Do stronger creditor rights affect firms' access to credit?

This paper uses the passage of an enforcement on cash assets reform in Croatia to identify the impact of stronger creditor rights on firms' capital structure and investment. The Act on Execution of Cash Assets benefited mostly the unsecured creditors, as it made easier the collection of unsecured debt. Using a novel dataset on courts' efficiency on the specific type of cases affected by the reform and implementing a Difference-in-Difference analysis, I find that firms maintain higher leverage and have easier access to credit when creditor rights are stronger. The firms that benefit most are medium size and have limited access to tangible assets. When firms are able to borrow more, they invest more in fixed assets.

Distinctions and Awards

Columbia Business School, Finance Division, Best PhD Paper Award	2017
Arora - Naldi, Doctoral Fellowship	2017
Fordham Gabelli School of Business, Outstanding PhD Student Paper	2017
Deming Center, Doctoral Fellowship	2016
Columbia Business School, PhD Fellowship	2013 – 2017
Alexander S. Onassis Foundation, Doctoral Fellowship	2013 – 2017
Alexander S. Onassis Foundation, Fellowship	2010 – 2011
Fulbright Foundation, Fellowship	2010 – 2011
Graduated 1 st among 145 students from Athens University of Economics & Business, Department of Economics	2009
State Scholarships Foundation, Fellowship	2005 – 2009
Ranked 4 th nationally for admission to Athens University of Economics & Business, Department of Economics	2005

Teaching Experience

Senior TA for Columbia Executive Education, Debevoise Business Education Program	Fall 2016
Junior Instructor for Introduction to Business, Finance and Economics, Columbia Program for High School Students	Summer 2016
TA for Debt Markets, MBA course	Spring 2016
TA for Columbia Executive Education, Debevoise Business Education Program	Fall 2015

Professional Experience

The World Bank , Washington D.C., USA <i>Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit</i> Associate, involved in Economic Policy, Justice Sector, and Governance projects in Azerbaijan, Croatia, Kazakhstan, the Philippines, and the Russian Federation	2011 – 2013
Institute of Strategic & Development Studies , Athens, Greece <i>Junior Researcher</i>	2009 – 2010

Languages

Greek (native), English (fluent), German (intermediate)

References

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